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THE "BORN ALIVE" RULE:
A PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE NEW YORK LAW
BASED ON MODERN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY
[L]aw, equity and justice must not themselves quail and be
helpless in the face of modem technological marvels presenting
questions hitherto unthought of.'
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1949, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Hayner,2
enunciated the common-law born alive rule. The rule applies to
homicides-in particular, the unconsensual killing of unborn fetuses. It
requires proof that (1) a child lived outside the womb after birth;
and (2) the child's life was sustained by independent circulation before the
child died due to an external force that occurred while in the womb.' In
1965, the born alive rule was codified in the New York Penal Law,4
which defines a person as a "human being who has been born and is
alive." 5 The New York State Appellate Division first applied the born
alive rule in June 1990, in People v. Hall.6 This was the first time this
court had to decide whether an individual could be convicted of the
homicide of a child who was born alive but then died as a result of
wounds inflicted on the child's mother during her pregnancy. 7 In Hall,
the child died after an emergency Caesarean birth that was necessitated by
a gunshot wound inflicted on the mother.' The court upheld Hall's
conviction of involuntary manslaughter. 9 Although the fetus was twentyeight- to thirty-two-weeks old and viable when the mother was shot,' the
manslaughter conviction would not have been sustained if the child had
died prior to birth."
1. /nre Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 665 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2. 90 N.E.2d 23 (N.Y. 1949).
3. See id. at 25.
4. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.00-.05 (McKinney 1965), amended by N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.05 (MeKinney 1970).
5. Id. § 125.05(1) (in 1965, no provision existed for the 24-week pregnancy

termination).
6. 557 N.Y.S.2d 879 (App. Div. 1990), aff'g 511 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
7. Id. at 880.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 880-81.
10. Id. at 880.
11. Id.at 883. A person cannot be convicted of homicide unless the victim was first
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This note explains the history of the born alive rule and its adoption
by various courts. While doing so, this note emphasizes New York law"
and the Hall decision 3 and discusses the decisions of other state courts
and legislatures." Several states have enacted legislation overruling the
born alive rule and have added fetal homicide as a statutory criminal
offense. 5 South Carolina16 and Massachusetts 7 courts have gone so far
as to make fetal homicide a common-law crime.
When comparing the New York rule with fetal-homicide laws of other
states, it becomes apparent that New York's born alive rule should be
abolished. Instead, New York should enact legislation offering greater
protection to the unborn fetus. A law that makes the killing of a fetus at
a point as early as conception a homicide punishable by law, however, is
as unattractive as the present law. Nonetheless, New York would be
justified in following those states that have enacted fetal-homicide laws to
punish, as well as to stigmatize, individuals for causing the cessation of
a viable fetus. Viability is the point in fetal growth at which a fetus can
survive outside the womb with or without the benefit of medical
technology.1 8
Modern medical technology has had, and will continue to have, an
impact on the existence of the born alive rule. With the use of
ultrasonography and amniocentesis, medical experts can determine the
point at which a fetus is viable.1 Modern Supreme Court decisions
discussing a right to life, 2' as well as those discussing a right to die, 21
born alive. The trial court never held that an unborn fetus could be considered a person
under the homicide provisions. Id.
12. See discussion infra part M.A.
13. See discussion infra part I.B.
14. See discussion infra part II.C.
15. See id.
16. See State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); see also discussion infra part

m.D.2.
17. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984); see also discussion
infra part HI.D. 1.
18. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (discussing the existence of fetal
viability based on trimesters in the pregnancy).
19. See Websterv. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 514-15, 530-31 (1989)
(upholding a Missouri statute creating a presumption of viability that must be rebutted by
medical tests before an abortion may be performed).
20. See, e.g., Webster, 492 U.S. at 502 (upholding the use of medical tests to
determine gestational age, weight, and lung maturity).
21. See, e.g., Cruzanv. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841,2854 (1990)
(finding that the potential of medical advances allows for reversal of life-sustaining
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illustrate the Court's acceptance of medical evidence to determine if life
exists.
Recent abortion decisions must be discussed, however, in any attempt
to bring the definition of person, for purposes of homicide law, up to date
with modern achievements and values.' Although abortion involves the
consensual termination of a fetus and the born alive rule concerns the nonconsensual killing of a fetus, the issues have always been interrelated.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE BORN ALIVE RULE: COMMON-LAW
DISTINCTIoN BETWEEN FETAL LIFE BEFORE AND AFTER QUICKENING

In the thirteenth century, Henry de Bracton, Chancellor of Exeter
Cathedral and Justice of the Court of King's Bench in England, was
unique in distinguishing between formation and animation of the fetus in
the womb.' Other medieval writers equated physical formation with
rational animation, although Bracton suggested animation could follow
formation.' Animation was agreed to be the moment at which a rational
soul infused into the developing fetus-sometime between conception and
birth.' The early English common law of abortional homicide was
modeled after Bracton's view. The period of animation was labeled as the
time of quickening-the time between the sixteenth and eighteenth week
of pregnancy, when the fetus begins to stir.' By the seventeenth century,
Sir Edward Coke had accepted the common-law view as evidenced by his
famous statement:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise
killeth it in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe
dyeth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is
a great [misdemeanor], and no murder; but if the childe be born
alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is
murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum
natura, when it is born alive.'
treatment to rehabilitate the patient).
22. See discussion infra part IV.B.
23. See Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the
Status of the Fetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411,
419 (1968).
o
24. Id.
25. See id. at 411.
26. See id. at 420.
27. 3 SIR EDWARD COKE, INsTnIus 50 (1648). "Misdemeanor" is the American
courts' translation of Coke's term "misprision." Means, supra note 23, at 420.
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Coke's words make it apparent that the common law did not view an
abortional act before quickening as any type of offense. An abortional
killing after quickening was a misdemeanor if the child died within the
womb and was stillborn;' the killing was murder only if the
fetus (1) was quickened; (2) was born alive; (3) lived for a brief interval;
and (4) died.' This is the so-called born alive rule, in which killing a
fetus is .murder only if the fetus is born alive and subsequently dies as a

result of acts committed on the mother while the fetus was in the womb.
One century later, Blackstone reiterated and expanded Coke's born alive
rule.~
By 1850, many states recognized the born alive rule to support murder

indictments. 3 The only evidence of the New York common-law rule,
however, appeared in Evans v. People, 2 decided 43 years after the

Revised Statutes of 182933 replaced New York's common law. In Evans,
the court noted that, at common law, to cause the death of an unborn fetus
was not murder; rather, the willful destruction of an unborn infant quick
in the womb was a high crime and was manslaughter only if rendered so
by statute.3 The New York Revised Statutes, however, included a
feticide statute that deemed the killing of an unborn quickened fetus first-

degree manslaughter.' Yet, the feticide statute was never actually used
28. See Means, supra note 23, at 420.
29. Id.
30. See 1 WILLIAM BiACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129-30. Blackstone stated that
if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it in her
womb; or if any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is
delivered of a dead child; this though not murder, was by the ancient law
homicide or manslaughter. But the modern law doth not look upon this offence
in quite so atrocious a light but merely as a heinous misdemeanor.
Id.
31. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52, 54 (1849) (stating that it was not murder
to kill a child before it was born, even if it was killed in the process of delivery);
Pennsylvania v. McKee, 1 Add. I (Pa. 1791) (reiterating the common-law born alive rule
by requiring proof that the child was born alive to support a murder indictment).
32. 49 N.Y. 86 (1872).
33. N.Y. REV. STAT. 1829, pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2, § 8, amended by N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125 (McKinney 1965).
34. See Evans, 49 N.Y. at 88 (finding that an unborn infant is not considered a person
upon whom the crime of murder can be committed).
35. See N.Y. REV. STAT. 1829, pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2, § 8 (reading that "[t]he willful
killing of an unborn quick child, by any injury to the mother of such child, which would
be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed manslaughter in the
first degree").
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to prosecute anyone for a homicide other than illegal abortion.' An
abortion law was enacted as a companion section, which rendered an act
manslaughter.Y This
intended to procure a miscarriage second-degree
38
abortion law is similar to those in effect today.
In 1850, California enacted a Crimes and Punishment Act,39 modeled
after the then existing New York Penal Law, 40 but declined to adopt a
provision punishing a special crime of feticide. California also enacted an
abortion statute, but unlike the New York provision, it was separate and
apart from the homicide statute.41 The California Court of Appeal
continued to apply the born alive rule, but did so rather broadly in People
v. Chavez.42 The Chavez court proclaimed that "a viable child in the
process of being born is a human being within the meaning of the
[California] homicide statutes, whether or not the process has been fully
completed."' The court reasoned that a viable child. should be
considered a human being when it is a living baby, or when, in the natural
course of events, a birth that is already started would be successfully
completed." The court took the realities of life into consideration instead
of merely relying on legal fictions.4' This ruling, however, does not
36. See People v. Joseph, 496 N.Y.S.2d 328, 329 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
37. See N.Y. REV. STAT. 1829, pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2, § 9. The statute reads,
[e]very person who shall administer to any woman pregnant with a quick child,
any medicine, drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument
or other means, with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless the same shall
have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been
advised by two physicians to be necessary for such purpose, shall be deemed
guilty of manslaughter in the second degree.
Id.
38. See discussion infra part III.; Means, supra note 23, at 449. Until 1965, the only
significant abortion statutory change was a movement of the dividing line between simple
abortion and manslaughter six weeks farther from quickening to the end of the 24th week.
See id. at 442-43; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.15 (McKinney 1989) (providing that
second-degree manslaughter is the killing of a female by a non-consensual "abortional
act").
39. 1850 Cal. Stat. ch. 99, §19, p. 231 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 187
(West 1988)).
40. See N.Y. REV. STAT. 1829, pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2, § 9.
41. See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 25950, 25951 (West 1984).
42. 176 P.2d 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (convicting the defendant of manslaughter for
the murder of her newborn infant, which she delivered in a toilet bowl, wrapped in a
newspaper, and left under a bathtub to be found dead the next day).
43. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
44. See id.
45. See id.
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stand for the proposition that a viable fetus who is not in the process of
being born is also a human being under homicide law.'
In the controversial case of Keeler v. Superior Court,4' the California
Supreme Court, relying on the Chavez decision and legislative intent,
upheld the same interpretation of the bom alive rule." In Keeler, the
defendant, infuriated that his ex-wife was pregnant, threw her against a
car and tried to "stomp the baby out of her" by shoving his knee into her
abdomen.49 The fetus was stillborn due to severe head fractures.' The
defendant initially was charged with willful infliction of traumatic injury
upon his wife, assault on his wife by means of force likely to cause great
bodily injury, and murder of the baby.51 The California Supreme Court,
however, granted the defendant's writ of prohibition to prevent the
superior court from prosecuting him on the murder charge.5 2 The court
reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the unborn fetus in
the homicide statute, it would have done so.53 It was not the court's duty
to broaden the statute; to do so would have been to deny the defendant due
process of the law because he was not given advance notice of such broad
statutory interpretation. ' After Keeler, California revised its homicide
statute to include the term fetus; it is now a feticide statute.5'
III. MODERN-DAY LAW DEALING WITH THE BORN ALIVE RULE

A. New York Law
The New York Court of Appeals did not enunciate the born alive rule
until the 1949 landmark decision of People v. Hayner.' The court did
46. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 629 (Cal. 1970).
47. Id. at 617.
48. See id. at 628-30.
49. Id. at 618.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 619.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 619-20.
54. See id. at 626; see also Boule v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1964)
(proclaiming that "when an unforeseeable state-court construction of a criminal statute is
applied retroactively to subject a person to criminal liability for past conduct, the effect is
to deprive him of due process of law in the sense of fair warning that his contemplated
conduct constitutes a crime").
55. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (providing that murder
is the killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought).
56. 90 N.E.2d 23, 24 (N.Y. 1949) (acquitting the defendant of manslaughter because
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not apply the born alive rule as broadly as the California court did in
Chavez, 7 but instead adhered strictly to the common-law rule. The court
enunciated a two-pronged test that required proof that (1) a child lived
outside the womb after birth; and (2) the child's life was sustained by
independent circulation before the child died due to an external force that
occurred while in the womb. 58 In Hayner, the defendant purposefully
strangled his daughter's baby with its own umbilical cord while assisting
its delivery." Because evidence of livebirth was insufficient, he was not
convicted of murder.'
The New York Penal Law of 1965 codified the born alive rule in its
homicide statute.61 Section 125 of the Penal Law provides, in part, that
homicide includes abortion in the first degree and defines homicide as
"conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn child with
which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four (24)
weeks." 62 It was necessary, for statutory purposes, to limit this definition
of homicide to "unborn child[ren] ... more than twenty-four (24) weeks
old."' The reason for this limitation was that the statute also provides
that the offense of abortion in the second degree, which prohibits abortion
at an earlier point in the term, is not to be considered homicide.'
The various homicide offenses are defined in subsequent sections of
the Penal Law.' With the exception of abortion, the statutes require that
insufficient evidence existed to determine whether the dead baby had been born alive, fully
expelled from the womb, and had sustained life independent of the mother).
57. Compare Hayner, 90 N.E.2d at 25 (emphasizing the need of the fetus's complete
expulsion) with People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (stressing that the
fetus need only be in the process of birth).
58. See Hayner, 90 N.E.2d at 25.
59. See id. at 23-24.
60. See id. Hayner was also the baby's father and was later indicted for second-degree
rape, to which he plead guilty, and incest. See Leonard v. Barnes, 111 N.Y.S.2d 5 (App.
Div.) (dismissing Hayner's appeal regarding error on the part of the sentencing court),
aff'd, 303 N.Y. 989 (1952).
61. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1965).
62. Id.; see also People v. Joseph, 496 N.Y.S.2d 328, 329 (Sup. Ct. 1985)
(distinguishing between abortion in the first degree, occurring after 24 weeks of pregnancy
and considered homicide, and abortion in the second degree, occurring before 24 weeks of
pregnancy and prohibited but not deemed homicide).
63. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1989).
64. See Joseph, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 329; see also People v. Vercelletto, 514 N.Y.S.2d
177, 179 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (stating that in every case other than illegal abortion, proof was
required that the baby was born and was alive).
65. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.00-.60 (McKinney 1989).
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the victim be a person.' 6 Section 125.05(1) defines "person," in referring
to the victim of a homicide, as "a human being who has been born and is
alive."67 Courts have interpreted this definition as insuring that the death
of a person would not include the abortional killing of an unborn child."
In 1985, the court in People v. Joseph' found that the legislature did not
intend to make the non-abortional, or the non-consensual, killing of an
unborn child a homicide under section 125.05.' The court reasoned that
if the legislature had intended to do so, it would have specifically included
"fetus" in the definitions section. In the past, other state courts have
always insisted on clear legislative guidance before they would abrogate
adherence to the long-standing born alive rule, and the Joseph court
agreed with this practice. 7
B. The People v. Hall Decision
In June 1990, in People v. Hall,' the New York Court of Appeals
specifically dealt with the application of the born alive rule for the first
time. Hall involved a baby actually born alive that subsequently died due
to injuries inflicted upon its mother during her pregnancy. 3 The
defendant, Leonard Hall, while intending to shoot a man he had had a
fight with earlier that night, shot the mother, Ms. Brigette Garrett, in the
abdomen. 4 The bullets disrupted the oxygen flow to Ms. Garrett's
twenty-eight- to thirty-two-week-old fetus, and an emergency Caesarean
section was performed.7' Although premature babies born at her weight
normally have a ninety percent chance of survival, baby Atallia lived for
76
only thirty-six hours before she died from Hyaline Membrane Disease,
66. See id.
67. Id. § 125.05(1).
68. See id. § 125.05, construed in People v. Ebasco Servs., Inc. 354 N.Y.S.2d 807,
811 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
69. 496 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
70. See id. at 329-30.
71. See id. at 328-29 (citing State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1971); People
v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), appeal denied, 334 N.W.2d 616
(Mich. 1983); State ex. rel. Atkinson v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1984)).
72. 557 N.Y.S.2d 879 (App. Div. 1990) (HallI), aff'g 511 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct.
1987) (Hall 1).
73. See Hall II, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 881-82. Hyaline Membrane disease is also known as Respiratory
Distress Syndrome. Id. at 881. Heavy airless and congested lungs are symptomatic of the
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a condition common to premature babies.' This disease never occurs in
fetuses who remain in utero, but develops only in babies who are born
alive.7' The question before the court was whether a twenty-eight-weekold fetus removed from its mother's womb by Caesarean section and
immediately placed on a ventilator is a "person" within the meaning of
section 125.05 of the New York Penal Law. 9
The court followed the born alive rule as enunciated in Hayner
because the legislature had since incorporated it into section 125.05(1).o
The trial court found Atallia was born alive and was a person. 8 The
court based its conclusion on the testimony of several physicians who
witnessed Atallia's condition and on the fact that she was breathing for
thirty-six hours.' Although Atallia used a ventilator for breathing, the
court refused to presume that she was incapable of independent
existence. 83
Medical technology has made the use of cardiorespiratory machines
possible, and courts have recognized that breathing and heartbeat alone are
not indicia of life but are part of an integration of functions in which the
brain is dominant.5 4 Death occurs only when there is irreversible
cessation of brain functions.' Thus, Atallia's death did not occur until
thirty-six hours after her birth, when her brain died. The trial court
reasoned that a finding that the infant was incapable of sustaining
independent life would "further contradict the medical realities."" Hall
was found guilty of both second-degree manslaughter for killing baby
Atallia and of first-degree assault on her mother."
disease. Id. at 882. A doctor testified that the bullet wound to the baby's mother severed
the placenta and disrupted the flow of oxygen to the fetus thus having an impact upon the
development of the disease following birth. Id. at 881.
77. Id. at 881.
78. See id. The court considered expert testimony that a baby who dies in utero never
develops this syndrome. See id.
79. See id. at 880. For a discussion of the term "person," see supra text
accompanying notes 65-71.
80. See Hall H, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 883. The two-pronged test enunciated in Hayner was
used to answer the question of whether or not Atallia was born alive. See Hall 1,511
N.Y.S.2d at 534; see also supra text accompanying notes 56-71.
81. See Hall I, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
82. See id.; Hall 1, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
83. See Hall I, 511 N.Y.S.2d. at 534-35.
84. See id. at 534.
85. Id. at 535.
86. Id.
87. Hall H, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 881. A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second
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Based on the trial court's reasoning and its application of the born
alive rule, the appellate court affirmed.88 The appellate court also noted
that because Atallia's birth fit the criteria of a live birth under New York's
Public Health Law, a birth certificate had been filed. 9 Thus, the
definition of fetal death was not met--Atallia was unquestionably a
person within the meaning of the homicide statute.
Both the trial court and the appellate division relied heavily on
medical technology to determine the status of baby Atallia. If it had been
found that she had died before birth, Hall would not have been convicted
of manslaughter, but rather of the lesser offense of first-degree criminal
assault on the baby's mother. 9' If courts are willing to use medical
technology to this extent, then they should use it to determine whether an
unborn viable fetus may also be considered a person for the purpose of
homicide law. Currently, someone who performs an abortion after the
twenty-fourth week of pregnancy can be convicted of criminal abortion,
whereas someone who kills the same fetus by a non-abortional act can
only be convicted of criminal assault on the pregnant woman.' Although
degree when "he recklessly causes the death of another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW

§ 125.15 (McKinney 1989).
88. See Hall HI, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
89. See id. at 882; see also N.Y. PUB. HFALTH LAW § 4130(1) (McKinney 1989).
The statute reads,
[hlive birth is defined as the complete expulsion or extraction from its mother of
product of conception, irrespective of the duration of pregnancy, which, after,
such separation, breathes or shows any other evidence of life such as beating of
the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary

muscles, whether or not the umbilical cord has been cut or the placenta is
attached; each product of such a birth is considered live born.
Id.
90. See Hall HI,557 N.Y.S.2d at 882; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4160(1) (McKinney
1989). The statute reads,
[fletal death is death prior to the complete expulsion or extraction from its
mother of a product of conception; the death is indicated by the fact that after
such separation, the fetus does not breathe or show any other evidence of life

such as beating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite
movement of voluntary muscles.
Id.
91.

See Hall H, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 880, 882-83; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120. 10(i)

(McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992) (providing that a person is guilty of assault in the first
degree when "with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such
injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon."). The original
indictment charged Hall with attempted (intentional) murder in the second degree with

"John Doe" as the intended victim. This count, however, was dismissed. See id.
92. See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00-.02, 120.05-. 10, 125.40-.45 (McKinney

1989). Abortion in the second degree, a class E felony, is punishable by a minimum of one

1991]

N07E

the intent of the abortion statute may be to punish and to deter the
professional abortionist, the street criminal who kills a fetus should face
a similar stigmatizing charge.
The author proposes that New York create a statute that imposes a
greater stigma on defendants who are convicted of killing a fetus older
than twenty-four weeks by non-abortional methods. Wayne R. LaFave has
written that one reason for criminal sentences is "denunciation, or
condemnation-as a symbol of distinctively criminal 'guilt,' as an
affirmation and reenforcement of moral standards, and as reassurance to
the law-abiding."' Certainly, an offense entitled fetal homicide, or
feticide, would better serve this goal because society would logically view
fetal homicide as a much more stigmatizing offense than the offense
entitled criminal assault. At the very least, a fetal-homicide conviction
would let others know that the individual committed a violent act on a
pregnant woman and a fetus. In a criminal assault conviction, the
individual's act is more anonymous without further inquiry. Moreover, it
is conceivable that the criminal act is never known because either no
further inquiry is made, or the actor provides a sanitized version of the
act.
Perhaps voluntary and involuntary fetal homicide could be added to
New York's Penal Law to punish an individual for an act, not consented
to by a mother, that resulted in the death of a viable fetus. Voluntary fetal
homicide could be classified as a Class C felony, the same level offense
as second-degree manslaughter and first-degree assault.' Involuntary
fetal homicide could be classified in the same way as second-degree
assault and first-degree abortion.' By characterizing the new crimes in
to one-and-a-third years and a maximum of three to four years imprisonment. Id. § 70.002(e), § 125.40. Abortion in the first degree, a class D felony, is punishable by a minimum
of one to two-and-a-third years and a maximum of three to seven years imprisonment. Id.
§ 70.00-2(d), § 125.45. Assault in the first degree, a class C felony, is punishable by a
minimum of one-third of the maximum 15 years imprisonment. Id. § 70.00-2(d), § 120.10.
Assault in the second degree, a class D felony, is punishable by the same sentencing
guidelines as abortion in the first degree. Id. § 70.02-2(c), § 120.05. The assault offenses
overall are punishable by higher sentences. The abortion offenses, however, are more likely
to carry a greater stigma as society views abortion because a more heinous crime.
Manslaughter in the first degree, a class B felony, is punishable by a minimum of onethird the maximum, which is six to 25 years imprisonment. Id. § 70.00-2(b), § 125.20.
Manslaughter in the second degree, a class C felony, is punishable by the same sentences
as assault in the first degree. Id. § 70.00-2(c), § 125.15.
93. WAYNE R. LAFAvE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW CASES, COMMENTS AND
QUESTIONS 24 (2d ed. 1988).
94. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.10, 125.15 (MeKinney 1989).
95. Both of these offenses are Class D felonies. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.05,
125.45 (McKinney 1989).
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the same classes as abortion, manslaughter, and assault, the Penal Law
would remain consistent. These new offenses would carry more stigma
with them and possibly would make the mother, as well as society, feel
that justice was better served. New York should look to jurisdictions like
California, Minnesota, and Illinois for guidance and for an understanding
of why and how the common-law rule should be changed.'
C. Comparative Law of Other States
1. California
California law provides a good example of the shift from the born
alive rule to the application of a homicide statute in situations in which a
viable fetus has been killed. In People v. Chavez,' the court ruled that
a viable fetus in the course of birth was a human being for purposes of the
homicide statute.' In People v. Belous,99 the court indicated that the
ruling in Chavez did not, however, change the law to make an unborn
fetus the legal equivalent of a born child." ° The court found that "[tihe
intentional destruction of the born child is murder or manslaughter. The
intentional destruction of the embryo or fetus is never treated as murder,
and only rarely as manslaughter but rather as the lesser offense of
abortion."' In 1970, in Keeler v. Superior Court,"° the California
Supreme Court followed both Chavez and Belous in interpreting the
California homicide statute. The court held that the killing of a fetus was
a homicide only if the fetus was born alive, even though it may have been
viable while in the womb when the injury was inflicted upon the
mother."
Immediately following Keeler, in 1970, the California Legislature
amended its Penal Law to read that "[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."' 4 Acts that fall
5-acts solicited, aided, abetted, or
under the Therapeutic Abortion Aetff
96. See discussion infra part III(C).
97. 176 P.2d 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
98. Seeid. at94.
99. 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969).
100. See id. at 203.
101. Id.
102. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
103. See id. at 628-29.
104. 1970 Cal. Stat. ch. 1311, § 1 (amending 1850 CAL. STAT. ch. 99, § 19)
(emphasis added).
105. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-25957 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
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consented to by the mother that are performed by physicians and surgeons
when childbirth would more likely than not result in the death of the
mother or the fetus-are exempt from the Penal Law."° The purpose of
the amended statute was to punish acts, by third persons, that in the past
were protected by the born alive rule."°7
Because the legislature did not define "fetus," however, courts were

reluctant to enforce the newly amended statute when a question arose
about a fetus's viability." s In the 1976 decision of People v. Smith,"°

the California Court of Appeal applied the viability principle, set forth by

the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,"' to determine whether the
defendant's killing of his wife's baby constituted murder under
California's amended Penal Law."' The Roe Court had found that, until

viability, only the potential and expectancy for human life exists and, until
the beginning of the third trimester, the fetus is not yet viable and is
therefore not a human life."' Accordingly, the Smith court reasoned that
because the Penal Law"' defines the malice required for murder as "a
deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature,"

there can be no murder if there was no human life.

4

Although the

defendant had acted with malice aforethought in killing the twelve106. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(b)(3) (West 1988).
107. See id. § 187(b), (c) (amended 1970).
108. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501-02 (Ct. App. 1976).
109. Id.
110. 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
111. See Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 501-04; CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1991).
112. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-65 (stating that no compelling state interest exists in
the fetus until viability); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
513-22 (1989) (holding that the state may require tests on a woman carrying an unborn
child of 20 or more weeks to determine viability before an abortion may be performed);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976) (holding that a definition bf a
"viable fetus" that requires the possibility of the fetus being able to survive the trauma of
birth with or wiyhout artificial medical aid, is acceptable); Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03
(following Danforth, 428 U.S. at 53).
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1989).
114. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 501-02 (quoting CAL PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1990).
The court was not at all persuaded by the rationale that because "viability" was not
included in the statute, the legislature did not intend to have a viability requirement for fetal
murder. Id. at 501-04.
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to fifteen-week-old fetus, he was convicted of the lesser offense of
criminal116 abortion" 5 instead of murder because the fetus was not
viable.
Two years later in People v. Apodaca,"7 based upon uncontradicted

medical testimony as to the viability of the fetus at the time of slaying, the
court of appeal upheld the defendant's conviction for murdering a twentytwo- to twenty-four-week-old fetus.118 The court held that the question
of when the fetus becomes viable should rest on the circumstances of each
particular case." 9 Although the Roe Court observed that viability
generally occurs between twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks, the Court
did not limit viability to this specific period, nor did it foreclose medical
evidence to the contrary."2 Recently, a California court had the
opportunity to reevaluate California's fetal-homicide statute in People v.
Hamilton.' The court reaffirmed the use of the viability standard used
to convict the defendant of murdering a fetus that was twenty-six- to
twenty-eight-weeks old.'
2. Minnesota
In 1985, a Minnesota state court reinforced the born alive rule in the
absence of a homicide statute that explicitly included a fetus or an unborn.
In State v. Soto,"z the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's
decision to dismiss a murder indictment for the death of an eight-and-a
half-month-old viable fetus resulting from a car accident the defendant
caused while driving under the influence of alcohol. 11 A medical
examiner determined that the stillbirth was directly caused by the car
accident." z Minnesota's vehicular-homicide statute provides that a
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1989) ("Every person who... employs any
instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such
woman, except as provided in the Therapeutic Abortion Act, . . .is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison.").

116. See Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04.
117. 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1978).
118. See id. at 836.
119. See id. at 837-38.
120. See id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
121. 774 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1989).
122. See id. at 747-48. The jury had been instructed that the defendant could not be
convicted of murdering the unborn fetus unless they found beyond a reasonable doubt that
the fetus was viable. Id.
123. 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985).
124. See id. at 626.

125. Id. at 626-27. The medical examiner said the fetus suffered an "intereranial
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person is guilty of criminal vehicular operation resulting in death when the
person causes the death of a "human being," as a result of operating a
vehicle." Because Minnesota is not a common-law state, the court
relied on its strict interpretation of the penal code in making its
decision."12 The court used the born alive rule in interpreting the
provisions of its statute." It assumed that the born alive rule was a
substantive rule of criminal law that defined the criminality of the killing
of an unborn child." 2 This assumption is evident in the court's
reluctance to reject the born alive rule, fearing that the rejection would
violate the doctrine of strict construction by creating a new crime." 3
As a result of the Soto decision, the legislature responded to the
outcry of anti-abortion groups, as well as others, to protect the unborn
fetus in circumstances other than abortion."' In 1986, the Minnesota
legislature passed comprehensive legislation protecting unborn
children."
The Minnesota Penal Code, 33 in a section entitled
"Crimes Against Unborn Children," defines an unborn child as "the
unborn offspring of a human being conceived, but not yet born."1t The
statute does not include any type of viability requirement and, given its
plain meaning, can include a fetus only days or weeks old. 3
Although the statute specifically excludes from its coverage medical
abortions permissible under state law," anti-abortion groups supported
its passage because of its strong implications on abortion. It defines a fetus
as a person from the point of conception onward-a definition abortion
opponents have long been seeking. 37 On the other hand, this definition
is troublesome to abortion-rights advocates. 3 They believe that fetalhemorrhage associated with closed head trauma." Id. at 627.
126. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.21 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
127. See Soto, 378 N.W.2d at 627-28.
128. See id. at 629.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 630.
131. See generally William E. SchnLidt, Murder Trial Adds Facet to the Abortion

Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1990, at B5 (discussing the trend among states in adopting
homicide laws that allow child-abuse or criminal-neglect charges to be brought against
women who use drugs or alcohol during their pregnancy).
132. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266-.2691.

133. Id. § 609.266.
134. Id. § 609.266(a).
135. See Schmidt, supra note 131, at B5.
136. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.269.
137. Schmidt, supra note 131, at 35.
138. Id.
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homicide statutes sensitize people to the belief that an unborn fetus, at any
stage, is a person with rights. 3 9 The key distinction between abortion
and fetal homicide, however, is that abortion is an act carried out with the
consent of the mother, whereas fetal homicide is not."4
The Minnesota statute proves to be the most sweeping legislation of
its kind. It ignores the viability issue and, to convict a defendant of firstdegree murder, the State is not required to prove that the defendant had
actual knowledge that the woman was pregnant at the time of the act. 4'
This distinguishes the Minnesota law from the revised Illinois statute 42
because, to convict a defendant of first-degree murder in Illinois, the State
is required to prove that the defendant had knowledge that the woman was
pregnant."4 Furthermore, Minnesota imposes onerous penalties for those
convicted of this crime. A defendant who is convicted of the premeditated
murder of an unborn child must be sentenced to life imprisonment.' 44
The maximum sentence for a defendant convicted of non-premeditated
murder of an unborn child is forty years. 45 In contrast, both Arizona
and Indiana, the two other states that impose criminal liability for causing
the death of a fetus at any stage, provide a far less severe penalty upon
conviction. Arizona imposes
a five-year sentence,'" and Indiana imposes
47
a two-year sentence.
In State v. Merrill,14 the court was faced with applying this new
statute. In this case, a Minnesota man murdered his girlfriend and her
twenty-seven- or twenty-eight-day-old embryo. 49 It was unclear whether
the defendant or his girlfriend knew that she was pregnant at the time of
the murder." 5° The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the law and ruled that the defendant could be charged with both first139.
140.
U.S. 931
141.
142.

Id.
See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn.) (en bane), cert. denied, 496
(1990).
See id.; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266-.2691.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).

143. See id.
144. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661.
145. Id. § 609.2662.
146. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103-A-5 (1989).
147. IND. CODE ANN. § 3542-1-6 (Burns 1985).
148. 450 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Minn.) (en bane), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 323.
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degree and second-degree
murder for the resultant death of the twenty51
eight-day-old fetus.
In challenging the constitutionality of the statute, the defendant first
contended that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 152 because it does not distinguish between viable
He argued that although the statute exposed
and nonviable fetuses.
him to a conviction of murder for destroying an unborn nonviable fetus
during the first trimester of pregnancy, under Roe v. Wade,"M a woman
can do the same thing without facing criminal penalties and has an
absolute right to an abortion within the first trimester. 55 Thus, the
defendant claimed that he and a pregnant woman who chooses to have an
abortion are similarly situated people being treated dissimilarly, in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 15
The court disagreed, however, and held that a pregnant woman who
chooses to have an abortion, and a defendant who assaults a pregnant
woman causing the death of her fetus, are not similarly situated."57 The
assailant of a pregnant woman causing the death of her fetus does so
without the consent of the woman. This is not the same as the woman
who elects to have her pregnancy terminated by a legal abortion.15' The
woman's right to choose an abortion is based on her right to privacy. Roe
protects her choice"-it does not, however, protect a third-party's
unilateral right to destroy the fetus.16 ' The fetal-homicide statute protects
the mother and her unborn child from the intentional wrongdoing of a
third party. It also protects the potentiality of life without impinging
on a pregnant woman's privacy rights." 6
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See id. at 318.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321-22.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321.
See i.
See id. at 321-22.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 321-22.
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (1973).
Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 322.
Id.
Id.
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The Merrill court noted that the state "'has another important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.'""" The
Minnesota Supreme Court found that this interest includes protecting the
unborn child, whether or not viable, and also protecting the woman's
interest in her unborn child." In conclusion, the court ruled that "[t]he
interest of a criminal assailant in terminating a woman's pregnancy does
not outweigh the woman's right to continue the pregnancy. In this context,
the viability of the fetus is simply immaterial to an equal protection
challenge to the feticide statute."" Therefore, the court held that
although the statute fails to distinguish between a viable and nonviable
fetus, it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 67
In her dissent, however, Justice Wahl strongly disagreed with the
majority's opinion." She stated that the majority opinion properly
addressed the defendant's equal-protection concerns but found that the
defendant's challenge raised a question of substantive due process."
The requirements of due process limit "the manner and extent to which
conduct may be defined as cruel in the substantive crimiral law."" She
stated that the statute violated the defendant's right to substantive due
process 171because it fails to distinguish between viable and nonviable
fetuses.

Justice Wahl noted that the defendant was charged with murder and
murder is defined as the "unlawful killing of a human being by
another."' She continued, stating that a nonviable fetus is not a human
being," I and, under Roe, a State's interest in potential human life does
not become compelling until viability.174 Implicit in Roe is the

conclusion that the destruction of a nonviable fetus is not the taking of a
human life and cannot constitute murder. 75 Therefore, she concluded,
unless the words unborn child are construed to read unborn viable child,
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162).
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 326-27 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
Id. at 326.
Id. (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINALLAW'§ 20, at 136 (1972)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 326 (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTONARY 918 (5th ed. 1979)).
173. Id. at 327.
174. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973)).
175. Id. (citing People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (Ct. App. 1976)).
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the reach of the statute is unconstitutionally broad."' In her opinion, the
state violated the defendant's due process. 77
The defendant also argued that the statute violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"8 because it fails to give fair
warning of the prohibited conduct and encourages arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.' 79 A state criminal statute is void for
vagueness if it fails to define a "criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited
and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."" ° The Merrill defendant contended that it was unfair to
impose a criminal penalty on the murderer of a pregnant woman for the
death of her unborn child, when neither the assailant nor the woman may
have been aware of the pregnancy."8
The majority concluded that the statute provides the necessary fair
warning required by the Due Process Clause." 2 The doctrine of
transferred intent applies when the intent being transferred is for the same
type of harm."s Here, because the court found that the harm to the fetus
and the harm to the mother are substantially the same, it- therefore
concluded that the intent to kill the mother is transferable to the fetus.1&4
Thus, an assailant may not safely exclude the possibility that a female
homicide victim of childbearing age is pregnant.s
Next, the defendant claimed that the statutory phrase "causes the death
of an unborn child" is incapable of objective measurement in dealing with
a nonviable fetus at an early stage.' The defendant contended that the
point in time when life begins and death occurs was left uncertain by the
statute and, therefore, would result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement of the statute.'I
The defendant additionally argued that to cause death, there must first
be life. The court found difficulty this argument because it raised profound
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 323.
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 323.
See id.
Id.; LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 170, at 243.
See Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 323.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court concluded, however,

that the statute does not require the State to prove that there was human
life-it only requires proof that the embryo within the mother's womb had
life and that, because of the defendant's acts, the embryo no longer
does." 9 Therefore, the court ruled that the statute was not applied in a
discriminatory or arbitrary manner and did not violate the Due Process

Clause.Y°
The United States Supreme Court declined to review Merrill without
comment. 1 9' The case was brought to trial, and the defendant became
the first person ever to be convicted of second-degree intentional fetal

homicide." 9 He was sentenced to twenty-nine-and-a-half years in
prison. 93
188. See id. at 324.
189. See id.
190. See id. In his dissent, Justice Glenn E. Kelley said that absent a definition of
when life and death occur, the statutory phrase "causes the death of an unborn child" is
"burdened with ambiguity" and "invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. at
324-25. (Kelley, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part). He continued, "[w]ithout
adequate definitional standards for guidance, it is not only possible, but probable, in my
opinion, that different judges might resolve the issue differently." Id.
191. See State v. Merrill, 496 U.S. 931 (1990).
192. See State v. Merrill, No. C6-91-290, 1991 Minn. Ct. App. LEXIS 790, at *1
(Aug. 13, 1991); Schmidt, supra note 131, at B5.
193. See Me.ll, No. C6-91-290, at *2. Merrill was also convicted for the intentional
murder of his girlfriend. Id.
In another Minnesota case, a defendant was charged with assisting a suicide and
charged with felony fetal homicide because the suicide victim was pregnant. State v. Bauer,
471 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). The defendant conceded that a number of
constitutional challenges to the statute had been rejected in Merrill but argued that the
statute was nevertheless unconstitutional because it violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, an argument not made in Merrill. See id. at 365. In order to withstand
an Establishment Clause challenge, a statute must (1) have a secular legislative purpose;
(2) have a principal or primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3)
not foster excessive goveroment entanglement with religion. Id. The defendant claimed that
the statute lacked a secular legislative purpose. The Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed,
noting that the state has the ability to criminalize behavior affecting unborn children and
that the imposition of criminal liability is generally a secular matter. See id. at 365-66.
Prohibiting the termination of a pregnancy was not necessarily done to serve a religious
purpose. See id. The defendant was given a 24-month sentence for aiding a suicide and a
concurrent 60-month sentence for felony fetal homicide. See id. at 365.
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3. Illinois
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Illinois adhered to the common-law
born alive rule in deciding People v. Greer.19 The court applied the
same rationale as the California court applied in Keeler, which was that
in the absence of an express inclusion of fetus in a homicide statute, a
court cannot rule that the killing of an unborn fetus is murder.' The
Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 did not expressly apply to fetuses but stated
that "[a] person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits murder."" 6 The word "individual" was not defined. In Greer,
the defendant killed a viable eight-and-a-half-month-old fetus. 1"
Although the court agreed in part with the State's position that the fetus
should have been considered a human being," 9a the defendant was
acquitted of the murder of the fetus. The court rationalized that if the
General Assembly had intended to make the destruction of a viable fetus
murder, it would have included fetus in the homicide law." 9
Five years after Greer, the Illinois legislature enacted a separate
feticide statute.' For a feticide conviction to be obtained, the statute
required proof that the fetus was capable of sustained life at the time of
death and that the defendant knew that the mother was pregnant at the
time of the act.2" t Under this law, the state supreme court sustained the
murder conviction of a man who shot a woman whom he knew was ninemonths pregnant.' In 1986, the legislature repealed the feticide statute
and passed a statute entitled "Intentional Homicide of an Unborn
194. 402 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1980).
195. See id. at 209.
196. L. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1989) (emphasis added).
197. Greer, 402 N.E.2d at 205.
198. See id. at 208-09. The State contended that the born alive rule is inadequate in
the modern day because of major advances in medical knowledge and technology. Id. at
207. A viable fetus now has a high probability of surviving outside the womb and is
regarded as a distinct individual with its own circulatory system. Id. The State also pointed
out that the court has extended tort remedies to encompass prenatal injuries. Id. at 207-09.
C. Green v. Smith, 377 N.E.2d 37 (III. 1978) (allowing wrongful death action for the
death of a fetus due to injuries sustained while it was viable); Renslow v. Mennonite
Hasp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977) (allowing a child to sue for prenatal injuries).
199. See Greer, 402 N.E.2d at 209, 213.
200. See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (repealed
1986).
201. See id.
202. See People v. Shum, 512 N.E.2d 1183, 1187 (Ill. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1079 (1987). Although the statute was repealed in 1986, the shooting occurred in 1982
while it was in effect. See id.
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Child."' This statute, still in effect today, provides that to be convicted
of the offense, the defendant must have intended to cause the death of
either the fetus or the mother, have intended to cause great bodily harm,
or have known that the act would cause death or great bodily harm.'
The defendant must also have been aware that the woman was pregnant
at the time of the assault.' Furthermore, the statute provides that the
phrase "'unborn child' shall mean any individual of the human species
from fertilization until birth."" This definition seems overbroad
because of the difficulty in positively determining whether life begins at
fertilization.
In 1991, however, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the conviction
of a man under the new Illinois statute and upheld the statute's
constitutionality.? The defendant was convicted and sentenced to twenty
years in prison for the intentional homicide of an unborn child that was
twenty-two weeks old. 208 In his appeal, the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the fetal-homicide statute, contending that it violated
both the Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution.'
The court relied on the Minnesota court opinion 10 and held that a
pregnant woman who chooses abortion and a defendant who kills a fetus
by assaulting a pregnant woman are not similarly situated. n The court
found that the distinction between these two classes of people bears a
rational relationship to the purpose of the statute, which is to protect the
potentiality of human life. 212 Therefore, the court held that the statute
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.213
203. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
204. See id. para. 9-1.2(1).
205. See id. pam. 9-1.2(3).
206. Id. para. 9-1.2(3)(b); see also id. para. 9-1.2(3)(d) ("Penalty. The sentence for
intentional homicide of an unborn child shall be the same as for first degree murder, except
that the death penalty may not be imposed."); id. para. 9-2.1 (entitled "Voluntary
Manslaughter of an Unborn Child"); id. para. 9-3.2 (entitled "Involuntary Manslaughter
and Reckless Homicide of an Unborn Child").
207. See People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587
N.E.2d 1019 (1992).
208. See id. at 1190.
209. See id. The Minnesota statute had been challenged on the same grounds. See
supra text accompanying notes 148-93.
210. See Ford, 581 N.E. 2d at 1199.
211. See id. at 1199.
212. See id. at 1200.
213. See id.
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Next, as in State v. Merrill,1 4 the defendant argued that the fetal
homicide statute was unconstitutionally vague because the phrase "caused
the death" is "fraught with uncertainty and ambiguity and in many
instances would be incapable of objective measurement in dealing with
nonviable embryos at an early stage."2" 5 The defendant contended that
absent a definition of when life and death occur, the trier of fact will
apply "subjective religious, philosophical, and political views to define
those terms, thereby leading to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
of the statute."216 Again, the court adopted the rationale of Merrill.2 17
The court held that it is unnecessary to prove that the unborn child is a
human being-the trier of fact need only determine whether the entity once
had life.218 Therefore, the statute will not be applied in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner and does not violate the Due Process Clause.219
The defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed.'
D. Fetal Homicide as a Common-Law Crime
As previously discussed, New York, California, Minnesota, and
Illinois courts would not convict anyone for fetal homicide in the absence
of a homicide statute expressly including an unborn fetus as a victim."
To date, however, courts in two states have taken it upon themselves to
make fetal homicide a common-law crime.=
1. Massachusetts
In Commonwealth v. Cass,' the defendant, Daniel I. Cass, was
charged with vehicular homicide.' While operating a motor vehicle,
214. 450 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn.) (en bane), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990).
215. Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1200.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 1201; see also Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 324 (holding that unborn child
homicide statutes are not fatally vague for failure to define the phrase "causes the death of
an unborn child" because they do not require that fetuses be considered human beings).
218. See Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1202.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See discussion supra part I.A-C.
222. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328-29 (Mass. 1984); State v.
Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984).
223. 467 N.E.2d at 1324.
224. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24G (West 1989). The statute reads,
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Cass hit a female pedestrian who was eight-and-a-half-months
pregnant. 5 The fetus was delivered stillborn and its death was caused
An autopsy
by injuries sustained when the mother was struck.'
revealed that the baby had been viable at the time of the accident.'
A person is guilty of violating the Massachusetts vehicular homicide
statute if the person causes the death of another person while operating a
motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs.' The statute
makes no mention of a fetus.' The question before the court was
whether the legislature intended a viable fetus to be considered a "person"
as that term is used in the statute?9o
Massachusetts criminal law is derived largely from the common law,
and the court, therefore, exercises its authority to develop new commonlaw rules when necessary. 1 Common law is applied to define statutory
terms within the limits permitted by the statutory language.' In a past
civil case, Massachusetts's highest court held that an eight-and-a-half-

month-old viable fetus is considered a person for purposes of the
wrongful-death statute? 3 The Cass court saw no reason not to extend

this definition to the vehicular homicide statute. 3 The court rejected the
preexisting common-law born alive definition used in Keeler because that
definition froze the meaning of "person" and made a "shibboleth of a rule
of construction."' s The born alive rule was also rejected in light of the
[w]hoever... operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, or of marihuana, narcotic drugs, depressants, or stimulant substances .
. . or whoever operates a motor vehicle recklessly or negligently so that the lives
or safety of the public might be endangered, and by any such operation so
described causes the death of another person, shall be guilty of homicide by a
motor vehicle ....
Id.
225. See Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1325.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24G (West 1989).
229. See Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1325.
230. See id. at 1327.
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. See Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Mass. 1975) (finding
that a policy of "conditioning a right of action on whether a fatally injured child is born
dead or alive is not only an artificial and unreasonable demarcation, but is unjust as well").
234. See Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1325-26 (holding that because the legislature enacted
the statute shortly after the Mone decision, the legislature knew that the term "person"
would be construed to include a viable fetus).
235. Id. at 1327.
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technology of modem medicine, which can now provide proof that the
fetus was alive at the time of defendant's act and died as a result of that
act.' The court used this reasoning, as well as its finding that society
would not want such a crime to go unpunished, to conclude that a viable
fetus could be a victim of vehicular homicide. 37 The new common-law
rule was not applied to defendant Cass, however, because it had not been
the law at the time he committed the act." The decision was to be
applied prospectively only, so as to afford Cass due process of law.1 9
2. South Carolina
The day after Cass was decided, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
decided State v. Home,' and, like the Massachusetts court, deemed the
killing of an unborn viable fetus a homicide.4" In Home, the defendant
stabbed his wife, who was nine-months pregnant, causing her baby to be
stillborn. 2 An autopsy determined that the fetus had been viable at the
time of the stabbing. 3 But, as in Cass, because this feticide rule had
not been in existence at the time that the defendant committed the act, he
was not convicted of manslaughter.'
The court noted that the new
feticide law was to be applied prospectively only in South Carolina.'
3. States Rejecting Common-Law Feticide
Three years later, when the same question came before the Supreme
Court of Arkansas, in Meadows v. Arkansas,' the court declined to
follow the decisions of Cass and Home. The defendant in Meadows, like
the defendant in Cass, was charged with the manslaughter of a viable
fetus, caused by drunk driving?27 But the homicide statute did not define
236. See id. at 1328-29.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 1329-30; see also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)
(holding that petitioners were denied due process because the state failed to afford fair
notice that the conduct for which they were convicted had been made a crime).
239. See Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1329-30.
240. 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
241. See id. at 704.
242. See id. at 703-04.
243. See id. at 704.
244. See i.
245. See id. at 704.
246. 722 S.W.2d 584 (Ark. 1987).
247. See i. at 585; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(3) (Michie 1989)
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the term "person." While the court agreed that common law should be
taken into account when construing a statute's undefined words, it did not
agree that a new common-law crime of feticide should be developed.5 8
Historically, courts created common-law crimes because the legislature
met infrequently and enacted little legislation. 9 The court recognized
that this is no longer the case and declared it the duty of the legislature to
define the scope of crimes, along with the punishment to be imposed for
them. o
Two months after the Meadows decision, in People v. Vercelletto,"1
a New York court faced with the same question also declined to follow
Cass and Home. In Vercelleto, the defendant was accused of
manslaughter for the death of a viable seven-month-old fetus, caused by
the defendant's drunk driving. 5 2 The court relied on its strict
interpretation of the homicide statute, which defined the term "person" as
a "human being who has been born and is alive."' Because the court
applied the born alive rule, the defendant was not convicted of
manslaughter.'" This is consistent with New York's past and continued
application of the born alive rule in other homicide cases.'
The court noted the confusion generated by New York's homicide
statutes and urged the legislature to determine whether the present statutes
adequately protect the fetus or require changes related to feticide5 It
planned to forward copies of the decision to New York's Law Revision
Commission and the chairpersons of the Senate and Assembly Judicial
Committees.5 7 Thus far, nothing has been done by New York's
legislature in response to the court's request.
(providing that a person commits manslaughter if "[he recklessly causes the death of
another person").
248. See Meadows, 722 S.W.2d at 585-87.
249. See id. at 586. In medieval England, judges created crimes from general
principles because the legislature met infrequently and, therefore, legislation was sparse.
Today, because legislatures meet frequently, the original rationale for developing commonlaw crimes has disappeared. Id.
250. Id. (noting that past legislation indicated the intent not to include a viable fetus
as a victim of manslaughter).
251. 514 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
252. Id. at 177-78.
253. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1989).
254. See Vercelleto, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
255. See discussion supra part M.A-B.
256. See Vercelleto, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
257. See id.

1991]

N07E

IV. THE BoRN ALrvE RULE AND ITS FuTuRE

A. The Definition of Life and Death
Although the born alive rule is obsolete from a medical standpoint,
courts deem it a substantive part of homicide law and adhere to the rule
requiring strict interpretation of penal statutes.2" At the time the
common-law born alive rule was established, medical technology was
unsophisticated. It could not be determined whether the fetus had been
alive or when it may have died.' The rule was merely evidentiary in
nature; -it served as proof to distinguish between life and death.' ° The
rule was not created to limit the class of human beings; it was created to
reflect the status of the fetus at common law." Because strict
interpretation of penal statutes requires that only substantive rules be
retained, the evidentiary born alive rule is not an obstacle in applying a
honicide statute to human beings, including fetuses. 2 New York,
however, has not agreed with this interpretation of the rule.
The New York Court of Appeals has accepted that the definition of
"life" or "death" may be affected by modem medical technology.=
This was indicated when the court ruled that a person may be declared
dead when an irreversible cessation of brain function occurs, even though
heartbeat and breathing are being continued by artificial means and the
person could technically be considered alive. ' The New York
legislature, however, has refused to stray from the born alive rule and to
use modem medical technology to redefine the term "person" as used in
the homicide statute.' If expert medical testimony is evaluated when
the question of death arises,' then it should also be used in evaluating
when life arises.
The United States Supreme Court relied on medical technology to
decide when death occurs in Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of
258. Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: he Born Alive Rule and
Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 607 (1987). Today 22 states retain
the born alive rule as part of their homicide law by state court decision. Id. at 596 n.161.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
in a case
265.
266.

Id. at 613 n.284.
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id.
See People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286, 289 (N.Y. 1984).
See id. at 286 (holding that the defendant was not relieved of criminal liability
in which the victim was declared dead according to brain-based criteria).
See discussion supra part HLI.A-B.
See Eulo, 472 N.E.2d at 294-95.
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Health.2 7 The Court agreed that before a hospital may be permitted to
withdraw life-sustaining equipment, the state may require clear and
convincing evidence of a coma victim's prior wish to have the equipment
withdrawn.' Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state and
possessed no cognitive functions.' In the majority opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that an erroneous decision not to terminate
Cruzan's life-sustaining treatment has a chance of being corrected, or at
least mitigated, by the "possibility of subsequent developments such as
advancements in medical science," whereas an erroneous decision to
terminate life support can never be corrected.' Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion, however, urged the Court to rely on present-day
medical technology and not to dwell on possibilities of future
miracles." Justice Brennan recognized that medical technology has
developed tremendously in the past twenty years and utilized statistical
data to show how many Americans are kpt alive solely by artificial
means-a practice with which he disagreed. z Both the majority and the
dissenters recognized the role modem medical technology plays in
effectuating present-day legal aims. Indeed, as far back as 1966, in
Schmerber v. California,' the Supreme Court has looked to medical
evidence to assist it in its decisions.
New York has made abortion after twenty-four weeks of pregnancy
a crime-an approach consistent with the Court's teachings in Roe v.
Wade. 4 Given the continued controversies in New York and other
jurisdictions, it is imprudent for New York's legislature to refuse to
impose liability on a third party who causes the death of a viable fetus.
The medical evidence available today regarding fetal viability should be
considered when answering the question when life begins, if not as a
general standard, then at least on a case-by-case basis.
Scientists have determined that a human being begins its existence as
early as conception. 5 A zygote is a "cell [that] results from [the]
fertilization of an oocyte, or ovum, by a sperm, or spermatozoon, and [is]
the beginning of a human being."
Although significant fetal
267. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
268. See id. at 2852-55.
269. Id. at 2845.
270. Id. at 2854.
271. Id. at 2873-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
272. See id. at 2877-78.
273. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that the extraction of blood for blood-alcohol level
is an accurate method of determining whether a person is under the influence of alcohol).
274. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1965).
275. See Forsythe, supra note 258, at 608-09.
276. Id. at 609 (quoting KErTH L. MOORE, THE DEVELOPINO HUMAN: CuNICALLY
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characteristics develop in the early stages of gestation,2 77 it is not until

approximately twenty-four weeks that the fetus is developed enough
to be capable of surviving

if delivered,

i.e.,

viable. 28

Fetal

development can now be monitored with the use of ultrasonography2
and amniocentesis.?
Ultrasonography is useful in determining the age of the fetus and in
detecting abnormalities and diseases."8 After only the sixth to ninth

week of gestation, the ultrasonogram can pick up fetal cardiac activity and
fetal motion.'8 It may not be able, however, accurately to predict fetal

lung maturity, which influences the survival of the infant.' In fact,
lungs are not fully developed until twenty weeks, and medical scientists
admit there cannot be viability without proper lung development.' This
evidence is invaluable in determining fetal viability, and it provides a firm
foundation and guide for legislators redrafting New York's feticide laws.

At a 1990 international conference in Iowa City, Iowa, legislation was
proposed that would protect the fetus at about seventy days after
ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY 13 (3d ed. 1982)) (emphasis in original).

277. See LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OP PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED
SPECIALTIES § 37.2b, at 11 (Charles J. Frankel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
LAWYERS' MEDICAL].

278. See id. § 37.2b, at 11-12. When the fetus is between 500 to 999 grams, which
is usually during the first 24 weeks of gestation, it is "immature" and has little chance of
surviving if born. When it is between 1000 and 2500 grams, usually between the 28th and
36th week of gestation, the infant is "premature" and chances of survival vary directly with
its weight and the adequacy of newborn care. Infants between 2500 and 4000 grams are
within normal limits of maturity. Id. at 10-12 (according to standards accepted by the
World Health Organization, pregnancy terminated at 20 weeks is an abortion but pregnancy
terminated after 20 weeks must be recorded as a birth); See also MAX BORTEN &
EMANUEL A. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN OBSTERICS AND

GYNECOLOGY 137 (1989) (stating that an infant delivered after 25 weeks gestation has a
25% chance of survival, a significant advance from the 1960s and 1970s).
279. Ultrasonography is the visualization of deep structures of the body by recording
the reflection of ultrasonic waves directed into the tissues. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1671 (25th ed. 1974).

280. See LAWYERS' MEDICAL, supra note 277, § 37.5j-k, at 27-34. Amniocentesis is
the process in which a needle is used to puncture the pregnant uterus through the abdominal
wall and a small sample of amniotic fluid is removed. Tests of the fetal cells contained in
the fluid can show chromosomal abnormalities, especially Down's syndrome. Id. § 37.5j,
at 27.
281. Id. § 37.5k, at 30.
282. Id. § 37.5k, at 33.
283. Id. § 37.5k, at 30.
284. Jeanette R. Pleasure et al., What is the Lower Limit of Viability?, 138 AM. J.
DISEASES CHILDREN 73 (1984).
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conception-the point when integrated brain functioning begins.2 HansMartin Sass, a professor at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown
University, said that this definition of the beginning of life, which he calls
"brain birth," parallels the definition of death, which is the irreversible
He believes this
cessation of brain function, or "brain death."'
proposal focuses on what is specifically human: "reason and
communication, cognition and consciousness."' This concept has been
criticized, however, as not really paralleling brain death. The critics
reason that with brain birth, unlike brain death, the potential for life
exists. 8 Furthermore, this theory implies that cognition and
consciousness occur ten weeks before full lung development, which has
been equated with viability.? 9 Whether this proposal will ever be
accepted, either as is or modified, will be interesting to see. The adoption
of this theory may bear heavily on abortion issues as well as on fetal
homicide issues.
B. Abortion Decisions and Their Relevance
to the Born Alive Rule
State courts have often misconstrued the Roe decision as applying
limitations on extension of homicide statutes to the unborn child. It is not
until recently that states began to use the rationale in Roe to uphold fetal
homicide statutes.' In Roe, Justice Blackrnun wrote that "[w]e need not
resolve the difficult question of when life begins."" 1 This quotation has
often been used to support the argument that the State can never define the
unborn child as a person.' What is ignored, however, is that the
Supreme Court was dealing with the definition of "person" in the context
of constitutional rights and a mother's right to privacy.' If the Roe
Court had included an unborn child in the definition of "person," the
mother would have been denied her constitutional right to abortion under
the Fourteenth Amendment.2
285. Peter Steinfels, Scholar ProposesBrain Birth Law, N.Y. TlMES, Nov. 8, 1990,
at A28.
286. Id.
287. Id.

288. See id.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See supra text accompanying notes 278, 284.
See supra text accompanying notes 148-93, 207-20.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
See, e.g., People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501-02 (Ct. App. 1976).
See Forsythe, supra note 258, at 616.
See id.
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The Roe Court affirmed the State's compelling interest in protecting
fetal life after viability.' 9 This decision was based on medical evidence
that placed the period of viability at generally twenty-four to twenty-eight
weeks-when the fetus presumably has the capability to live outside the
womb.' During the first trimester, before viability, the compelling
state interest is only in the health of the mother.' Throughout the
second trimester, the State can only regulate the safety of the procedure
used and cannot restrict abortions.' During the third trimester, after
viability, the State has a compelling interest in both the mother's health
and the fetus's life; thus, states may generally prohibit abortions, except
when necessary for the preservation of the mother's life.' This
exception, however, is becoming the rule because many lower federal
courts have interpreted the health restriction broadly." °
Although the Roe Court decided that a mother's right to privacy
outweighed the fetus's rights, the fetus may still have common law or
statutory rights against the criminal acts of a third party."' In the 1979
Louisiana case of State v. Brown,l Justice Blanche summarized the
context of Roe:
While Roe absolutely prohibits state regulation of a mother's
voluntary abortion during the first trimester, nothing in the
decision prohibits the state's regulation of other forms of feticide.
Roe does not prevent a state from adopting a particular theory as
to when life begins, but rather prohibits the state from using this
theory to override the rights of the pregnant woman.'
Therefore, Roe should not apply to non-consensual acts by third parties
and should not be used as a bar to judicial or statutory sanctions for
criminal acts of third parties.
295. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
296. See id. at 163.
297. Id. at 149, 164.
298. Id. at 164.
299. Id. at 163-65.
300. See, e.g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thonburgh,
737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984), aft'd, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (holding that states may regulate
abortions after viability in the interest of the unborn child and may even prohibit abortions,
except those to preserve the life or health of the mother).
301. See Forsythe, supra note 258, at 618.
302. 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1979).
303. Id. at 919 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
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On July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court narrowed its decision in Roe
when it decided Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.3 In Webster,
the Court upheld a Missouri statute creating a presumption of viability at
twenty weeks, which must be rebutted before the physician may perform
an abortion.'
The stringent guidelines pertaining to trimesters
enunciated in Roe were said to be uncharacteristic of our Constitution,
which is cast in general terms.3' The Court further criticized Roe,
finding that Roe's
framework sought to deal with areas of medical practice
traditionally subject to state regulation, and it sought to balance
once and for all by reference only to the calendar the claims of
the State to protect the fetus as a form of human life against the
claims of a woman to decide for herself whether or not to abort
a fetus she was carrying.'
The Court decided that Missouri's testing requirement was constitutional
and was better fit than Roe to ensure that an abortion would not be
performed after viability.30
Webster, along with other cases, shows the acceptance of medical
technology and its use to achieve legal aims. Like Roe, Webster should not
be construed to limit the States' definitions of a person in the context of
non-consensual acts of third parties. In fact, the recent Minnesota and
Illinois decisions' can be used as models to do just the opposite-to
justify the definition of a viable fetus as a person under the homicide
statutes.
V.

CONCLUSION

The born alive rule is still applied in many states despite today's
medical evidence of the early stages of fetal life. Exactly when life begins
will remain a difficult question, but medical technology can help us come
304. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
305. See id. at 513-21.
306. See id. at 518.
307. Id. at 520.
308. See id. Recently, although affirmning the Roe Court's holding recognizing a
woman's right to choose an abortion before viability, the Supreme Court continued to
narrow Roe's application in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). The
Court found that state regulations that are designed to foster the health of a woman seeking
an abortion before viability are valid if they do not constitute an "undue burden" on a
woman's right to choose. See id. at 2821.
309. See supra notes 148-93, 207-20 and accompanying text.
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closer to the answer for legal purposes. Justice is not adequately served
when an unborn viable baby can be killed by a non-consensual act without
the offender being seriously punished and stigmatized for committing the
crime. The laws that have been enacted for fetal homicide may not be the
perfect solution, but laws seldom are perfect. They are, however, certainly
closer to perfection than the born alive rule. The New York legislature
should use the fetal-homicide laws, together with medical research, to
develop a statute that better effectuates justice and punishes an offender
for a violent act committed on an unborn viable fetus.
Stephanie Ritrivi McCavitt

